

Land Grab or Development Opportunity Revisited: A Political Economy of Large-Scale Land Investment

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Introduction

Two distinct but intertwined research paths:

- **Nexus between Large-Scale Land Acquisitions (LSLAs) and the institutional context** in destination countries
- **Analysis agrarian political economy of Tanzania** to understand institutional and political drivers of large-scale land deals and what influences these factors may have on the success of such land deals


General aim:

- Draw the attention on the **institutional gaps that may lead to capture for private gains at the expense of the rights of local communities** and their access to productive resources.

Data




- **Land Matrix** (Global Land Matrix Observatory, 2017)
 - *Intended size, contract size, size in production*
- **Worldwide Governance Indicators** (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2009).
 - *Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption, available from the World Bank*
- Global Food Security Index (EIU, 2017)
- FAO Suite of Food Security Indicators (FAOSTAT, 2016)

Size and Number of deals in Tanzania



Source: Authors' elaboration on Land Matrix (as of 5/Jun/2017)

Intended, contract and production size VS Rule of Law



Overview of results

	Intended Size	Contract Size	Size in Production
INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES			
<i>Control of Corruption</i>	-0.289 (91)	-0.2187 (91)	0.1083 (91)
<i>Government Effectiveness</i>	-0.3371 (91)	-0.1948 (91)	0.1608 (91)
<i>Political Stability</i>	-0.3721 (91)	-0.2416 (91)	0.0801 (91)
<i>Regulatory Quality</i>	-0.2803 (91)	-0.1697 (91)	0.1284 (91)
<i>Rule of Law</i>	-0.2952 (91)	-0.2302 (91)	0.089 (91)
<i>Voice & Accountability</i>	-0.2268 (91)	-0.0952 (91)	0.1798 (91)
FOOD SECURITY			
<i>Global Food Security Index</i>	-0.4136 (65)	-0.0537 (65)	0.3743 (65)
<i>Child Underweight</i>	0.3332 (88)	0.1302 (88)	-0.2025 (88)

- In countries that attracted more the potential interest of investors (intended size) and in countries that contracted and leased (contract size) a higher amount of hectares throughout Large-Scale land deals we observe a poor institutional environment

But..

- Higher surface of land is put in production where we observe a relatively more robust institutional environment

Why land governance and institutions matters?

- Cotula, Vermeulen, Leonard & Keeley, 2009



- The positive economic, social and environmental effects of the proposed investments – the development opportunities – can materialize and can be assessed against the potential negative impacts only when these investments start

Land Governance and SDGs



1.4 By 2030, ensure that all men and women, in particular the poor and the vulnerable, have equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of property, inheritance, natural resources, appropriate new technology and financial services, including microfinance

1.4.1 Proportion of population living in households with access to basic services

1.4.2 Proportion of total adult population with secure tenure rights to land, with legally recognized documentation and who perceive their rights to land as secure, by sex and by type of tenure

Tenure Security & SDG Indicator 1.4.2- How do we measure perceptions on land tenure security?

20 June 2017 to 4 July 2017

OPEN

- **SDGs Indicators measuring land governance and land institutions are crucial**
- These indicators measure the performance of institutions and the perception of institutional performances, thus contributing in making institutions and governments accountable

Thank You

Get in touch with us!

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